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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

DAVID JOHNSON, an individual, and TESSA COUSINS, an individual,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
V.

DAVID CROSSETT, an individual
Defendant-Respondent

Supreme Court No. '-I'f 1 '1.l

And
SCOTT H. LEE, an individual, DRUG TESTING COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company, VURV, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, BO W. and
KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a married couple,
Defendants.

REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for Ada County.
HONORABLE D. DUFF MCKEE, District Judge presiding.

JAMES F. JACOBSON
Residing at Boise, Idaho, for Appellant
MICHELLE R. POINTS
Residing at Boise, Idaho, for Respondent.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
DAVID JOHNSON, and individual, and
TESSA COUSINS, an individual,
Supreme Court Case No. 44791

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
ADA COUNTY CASE NO. CV OC 1513887
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DAVID CROSSETT, an individual,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
SCOTT H. LEE, , an individual, DRUG
TESTING COMPLIANCE GROUP, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company, VURV,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
BO W." and KRYSTAL SCHMELLING, a
married couple,
Defendants.
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COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record, Jacobson & Jacobson,
PLLC, and hereby submits Reply Brief. 1

I.
INTRODUCTION

Defendant Crossett's arguments surrounding the issues of this case brought up on appeal,
are (1) consistently contradictory and conclusory, and (2) fail to apply the appropriate legal
standard, whether statutory or case law based, to the facts of this case. As such, he has failed to
show that the District Court (1) correctly applied the facts of this case to the appropriate legal
standards, (2) did not commit multiple prejudicial errors in law as outlined in Appellants' Brief,
(3) did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' motion for new trial due to said prejudicial
errors as outlined in Appellants' Brief, and (4) did not err in granting Defendant Crossett
attorney's fees under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) as outlined in Appellants' Brief. Therefore,
Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court reverse (1) the district court's denial of Plaintiffs'
motion for new trial and (2) the district court's award of attorney's fees to Defendant Crossett,
and remand this action to the district court for further proceedings consistent therewith.
II.

ARGUMENT

A. Defendant Crossett's arguments regarding the District Court's treatment of his
admission and its denial of the motion for new trial are contradictory and
conclusory.

1 As

Plaintiffs do not provide any new authorities in this brief in addition those listed in Table of Cases
and Authorities submitted with their Appellants' Brief, Plaintiffs do not provide a list of cases and
authorities in this brief. For a fully detailed list of cases and authorities that support Plaintiffs' arguments,
please refer to the Table of Cases and authorities submitted as part of the Appellants' Brief.
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Defendant Crossett's arguments surrounding his admission and the denial of the motion
for new trial are consistently contradictory and conclusory. Defendant Crossett's erroneously
argues (1) that an oral agreement existed between the parties that signing the written operating
agreement was a condition precedent to membership in DTC Group, and (2) that DTC Group
was a single-member LLC with Defendant Crossett as its sole member.
Initially, Defendant Crossett argues that the District Court's treatment of his admission in
the pleadings was not erroneous because Plaintiffs failed to satisfy a condition precedent to
becoming a member-that is signing the drafted, written operating agreement. See Respondent's
Brief, p. 6-7. However, this argument raises multiple problems for Defendant Crossett.
First, Defendant Crossett fails to provide any evidence that any such condition precedent
ever existed. There is no qualification in Defendant's admission in his pleading and no evidence
in the record of any oral agreement with a condition precedent.
Defendant Crossett refers to this alleged condition precedent.

Yet, throughout his brief,

See Respondent's Brief, p. 8,

11-12. This argument seems to be an attempt to explain the District Court's finding that the
simple drafting of the proposed written operating agreement superseded any previous oral
agreements between the parties. (See R000081-000083).

But, rather than make an effort to

show why the District Court's finding was correct through evidence in the record or through
statutory or case law, Defendant Crossett simply presumes that the District Court's findings was
correct. Such an argument is conclusory and not based on any facts or evidence.
Furthermore, this argument is contradictory as Defendant Crossett himself did not sign
the written operating agreement, and therefore also did not satisfy this claimed condition
precedent. Defendant Crossett alleges that "[Plaintift] Johnson and [Defendant] Crossett formed
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DTC Group, and orally agreed that becoming a member in DTC was contingent upon signing a
written operating agreement." Respondent's Brief, p. 8. Yet, Defendant Crossett did not sign the
written operating agreement himself. It seems disingenuous that, on the one hand, Defendant
Crossett argues that an alleged oral agreement between the parties required signing the written
operating agreement as a condition precedent to becoming a member of DTC Group, and then
claim to be a member when he failed to satisfy this alleged condition precedent. Carried to its
logical conclusion, Defendant Crossett's argument that the written operating agreement had to be
signed for any person to become a member of DTC Group means that DTC Group was an LLC
with no members.
Next, Defendant Crossett claims that Plaintiffs were not members of DTC Group as it
was a single-member LLC from its inception, and therefore the District Court did not err in
either ignoring Defendant Crossett's admission nor in its denial of Plaintiffs' motion for a new
trial. However, Defendant Crossett again fails to provide any evidence, either in the record or in
the law, to support his conclusion beyond conclusory statements in the District Court's Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Again, rather than make an effort to show why the District
Court's finding was correct through evidence in the record or through statutory or case law,
Defendant Crossett simply presumes that the District Court's findings was correct. On the other
hand, Plaintiffs' brief provides ample evidence, in both the record and that law, that DTC Group
was never a single-member LLC and that Plaintiffs were members from the inception of DTC
Group.

See Generally Appellant's Brief.

Like Defendant Crossett's previous argument

discussed above, such an argument is conclusory and not based on any facts or evidence.
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Furthermore, this argument contradicts other statements Defendant Crossett makes in his
brief. First, it is contradictory to argue that DTC Group was a single-member LLC on the one
hand, and then later claim that Defendant Crossett "was to receive a guaranteed distribution of
$60,000 to $65,000 per year." Respondent's Brief, p. 14. If DTC Group is, and always was a
single-member LLC, there would be no need for an agreement that Defendant Crossett would
receive a guaranteed distribution each year. The fact that there was a "guaranteed distribution"
agreed upon for Defendant Crossett presupposes that other members of DTC Group were also
owed a distribution. And, as only members can receive a distribution (See I.C. §§ 30-25-102(3),
30-25-102(11 )), it also presupposes that there are more members besides Defendant Crossett.
Therefore, it is contradictory to argue, on the one hand, that DTC was a single-member LLC with
Defendant Crossett as the only member, and then later argue that there was an agreement that
Defendant Crossett would receive a guaranteed distribution each year.
This argument also contradicts Defendant Crossett's reasoning behind his admission in
the pleadings. Defendant Crossett claims that it is "untenable" and "frivolous" to argue that "if
[Defendant Crossett] really thought he was the only member then he could only deny" the
allegation in the pleadings.

Respondent's Brief, p. 8.

However, it stands to reason that, if

Defendant Crossett truly believed, as he so vigorously argues in his brief, that he was the only
member of DTC Group from its inception and continued to be its only member throughout its
history up until its dissolution, he would clarify that he is "the" member of DTC Group, not just
"a" member. As such, it is neither untenable nor frivolous for Plaintiffs to make such a claim,
especially when one considers the law surrounding admissions in pleadings. See Knowles v. New
Sweden Irrigation Dist., 16 Idaho 217,229, 101 P. 81, 85-86 (1908), reversed on other grounds,
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Knowles v. New Sweden Irrigation Dist., 16 Idaho 235, 101 P. 81 (1909) ("Admissions made in a

pleading are denominated solemn admissions and are not required to be supported by evidence
on the part of the adverse party. Such admissions are taken as true against the party making
them, without further proof or controversy.").
B. Defendant Crossett's areuments fail to apply both statutory and case law standards
in his areuments.2

Like the District Court in its ruling, Defendant Crossett fails to appropriately apply the
statutory and case law standards surrounding the issues in this case. First, Defendant Crossett
argues that the District Court did not err in its treatment of his admission in the pleadings
because "[t]here is a difference in a group of people forming a company and becoming a member
of a limited liability company."

Respondent's Brief, p. 7.

However, this ignores the clear

standard set by the legislature in Idaho Code Sections 30-25-401 and 30-25-102(a)(9). See I.C. §
30-25-401 (stating that founders "become members as agreed by the persons before the
formation of the company" and that organizers, like Defendant Crossett, act on behalf of the
founders.); I.C. § 30-25-102(a)(9), cmt. (showing that when founders agree to join their activities
by the formation of an LLC, they become the initial members of the LLC "without further ado or
agreement."; Appellants' Brief, pp. 15-16. Defendant Crossett cites to no law or legal standard
which supports his assertion. In contrast, Plaintiffs provide ample law to support their assertion
that, as founders, they were the initial members pursuant to an oral operating agreement and that

The purpose of this section, and of this brief in general, is to point out the flaws in Defendant
Crossett's arguments. It is not to simply rehash the law and arguments Plaintiffs outlined in detail
in the Appellants' Brief. Plaintiffs believe that the arguments and legal standards in the Appellant's
Brief speak for themselves and that a full restatement of the law in this section would be a waste of
this Court's time. Therefore, Plaintiffs' statements of the law in this section will be brief, and will
refer summarily to the more detailed arguments set forth in the Appellants' Brief.

2
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the written operating agreement was meant to be an amendment to the oral operating agreement.
See Appellant's Brief, pp. 15-19.

However, the written agreement was never executed, and

therefore cannot be applied to this case.
Next, Defendant Crossett argues that it is "untenable" and "frivolous" to argue that "if
[Defendant Crossett] really thought he was the only member then he could only deny" the
allegation in the pleadings.

Respondent's Brief, p. 8.

However, as discussed above, this is

counter to the clear standard Idaho courts have set for the treatment of admissions in pleadings.
Again, Defendant Crossett provides no legal support as to why his admission should be treated
differently than how Idaho case law explains it should be treated, let alone any support for his
claim that Plaintiffs' argument is "frivolous."
Defendant further argues that the Idaho Code does not apply to Plaintiffs because the
District Court found that Plaintiffs were not members of DTC Group. Respondent's Brief, p. 9.
This is a conclusory argument similar to Defendant Crossett's arguments discussed in the first
section of this brief.

Like the District Court, Defendant Crossett fails to apply the clear

standards set forth in Title 30, Section 25 of the Idaho Code which exclusively details the
treatment of limited liability companies in the law. See Appellants' Brief, pp. 15-19 (showing
that proper application of the Idaho Code to the facts of this case establishes that the District
Court committed prejudicial errors in law and abused its discretion).
Finally, Defendant Crossett argues that the District Court did not err in granting him
attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) because Plaintiffs did not "get to" the
statutory penalties as the District Court found that they were not members of DTC Group.
Respondent's Brief, pp. 14-17. Defendant Crossett seems to believe that the standard for what
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comprises a commercial transaction is based on the ruling and not what is the gravamen of the
lawsuit. See Id This is a clear misstatement of the legal standard for attorney fee actions brought
under the commercial transaction clause of Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). The standard for such
attorney fee actions is a determination of whether the commercial transaction comprises the
gravamen ofthe action. See Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nw. Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466,471,

36 P.3d 218, 223 (2001) (quoting Bingham v. Montane Res. Assocs., 133 Idaho 420, 426, 987 P.
2d 1035, 1041 (1999)); Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624, 631, 903 P.2d 1321, 1328
(1995); Gumprecht v. Doyle, 128 Idaho 242, 245, 912 P.2d 610, 613 (1995).3 It is not whether
the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the ruling or outcome of the case. As this
action was brought to enforce statutory penalties, it is not considered a commercial transaction
under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). See Appellants' Brief, pp. 23-26. Like many of Defendant
Crossett's other arguments, this one simply concludes that the District Court was correct without
any effort to show why it was correct. And, like the District Court, Defendant Crossett failed to
apply the appropriate legal standard to attorney fee actions brought under the commercial
transaction clause ofldaho Code Section 12-120(3).

III.
CONCLUSION

Defendant Crossett's arguments in his Respondent's Brief are largely contradictory,
conclusory, or fail to apply the appropriate legal standard to the issues in this case. In short,
Defendant Crossett failed to establish that the District Court correctly applied the law to the facts

It is odd, considering the vast amount of case law establishing and defining this standard, that
Defendant Crossett neither cites to any of the cases nor mentions this standard in his Respondent's
Brief.

3
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of this case with regards to the issues brought up in this appeal. Indeed, it is clear, as detailed in
the Appellant's Brief, and based on application of the facts of this case to the appropriate legal
standards, that the District Court (1) committed multiple prejudicial errors in law and abused its
discretion by denying Plaintiffs' motion for new trial due to said prejudicial errors; and (2) erred
in awarding attorney's fees to Defendant Crossett under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3).
Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court reverse (1) the district court's denial of
Plaintiffs' motion for new trial and (2) the district court's award of attorney's fees to Defendant
Crossett, and remand this action to the district court for further proceedings consistent therewith.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of July, 2017

JACOBSON &.JACOBSON, PLLC

By,~~
fames F. Jacobson./
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of July, 2017, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document(s) was served upon:
Michelle R. Points
POINTS LAW, PLLC
910 W. Main, Ste. 222
Boise, ID 83702
Facsimile: (208) 336-2088

[X]
[ ]
[X]
[ ]

DATED this 31st day of July, 2017.

By:
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U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
iCourt/email
Facsimile

